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The Inevitable Collision: Affirmative
Action and the Constitution
I. INTRODUCTION
[I]n view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no
superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitu-
tion is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In
respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law. The humblest is the peer
of the most powerful. The law regards man as man, and takes no account of his
surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law
of the land are involved.'
The interests of Title V112 and those of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment3 therefore collide.4 In order to clarify the constitutional
questions involved, the Supreme Court must address affirmative action.5 As the
1. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559, 562 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (rejecting the
"separate but equal" doctrine stating that "[t]he arbitrary separation of citizens, on the basis of race,.
. is a badge of servitude wholly inconsistent with the civil freedom and the equality before the law
established by the Constitution"), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
(rejecting "separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy).
2. Title VII, which addresses discrimination in the workplace, states that individuals may not be
discriminated against on the basis of race. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994); infra text accompanying
note 80. "The legislative history of Title VII suggests both that Title VII was intended to remedy
discrimination against historically disadvantaged groups, in particular 'Negroes,' and that the statute's
broader purpose was to eliminate prohibited employment discrimination as applied equally to
everyone." E. Christi Cunningham, The Rise of Identity Politics I: The Myth of the Protected Class
In Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 30 CONN. L. REV. 441, 446 (1998).
3. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states, "No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.., nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1; see infra text accompanying note 70.
4. See infra note 66 and accompanying text (noting that interpreting a statute to authorize
discrimination is contrary to the protections within the Constitution).
5. See infra text accompanying note 63 (discussing the division in affirmative action legislation
among various states).
twentieth century draws to a close, the topic of 'ace-based preferences6 has become
exceedingly divisive and politically charged.7 The state of race relations in
America has become increasingly volatile because what constitutes equal
opportunity is subject to fierce debate.8 From college admissions9 and employment
issues,' ° to lucrative business contracts," affirmative action has crept into nearly
every facet of modem American life. It is ironic, as Time Magazine notes, that "for
all the effort to make the racial issue irrelevant, it has become more pervasive and
indelible."' 2
This Comment, like a traditional Comment regarding affirmative action, will
provide analysis pertaining to the historical events that shaped modem affirmative
action policies. However, this Comment will also examine the recent settlement
of Taxman v. Board of Education,3 a most intriguing display of political
maneuvering which remains shrouded in controversy." Taxman would have
6. Preferential affirmative action refers to "a system-be it quotas, timetables, goals, preferences,
set-asides-by which an institution utilizes group classification and preferences to reach desired racial,
ethnic or gender representation." See Robert D. Alt, Toward Equal Protection: A Review of
Affirmative Action, 36 WASHBURN L.J. 179, 181 (1997) (footnote omitted).
7. See generally David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Understanding Affirmative Action, 23 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 921 (1996) (discussing the controversy surrounding affirmative action). "The term
'affirmative action' is a political lightning rod. A discussion of its merits is almost always heated, and
accompanied by an underlying consideration of the sensitive subjects of race and racism, gender and
sexism." Id. at 922.
8. See David Hall, Reflections on Affirmative Action: Halcyon Winds and Minefields, 31 NEw
ENG. L. REV. 941 (1997) (discussing the importance of affirmative action in the creation of
opportunities for minorities as well as the emotion evoked in debate on affirmative action).
9. See generally Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (determining that race
may be a factor in admission process where white medical school applicant was denied admission to
medical school in favor of lesser qualified black students).
10. See generally Taxman v. Board of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547 (3rd Cir. 1996) (discussing the merits
of a diversity rationale for affirmative action where a white school teacher lost a teaching position in
favor of a black teacher to increase racial diversity in the school district).
11. See generally Robert Salladay, San Jose Suit Tests How 209 Affects Cities: Wilson Targets 35
State Laws He Says Violate Measure, S.F. EXAMINER, Sept. 10, 1997, at AI, available in 1997 WL
4345915 (discussing an electrical firm that lost a $200,000 contract, despite generating the lowest bid,
as a result of affirmative action policies).
12. See Tamala M. Edwards, Throwing the Book at Race: a Benchmark New Work Turns the
Accepted History of Racial Progress in America Upside Down, TIME, Sept. 8, 1997, at 60.
13. 91 F.3d 1547 (3rd Cir. 1996).
14. On November 20, 1997, a coalition of "key black leaders" paid Sharon Taxman and her
attorneys $433,500 to "drop her lawsuit." See David G. Savage, Civil Rights Leaders Pay to Settle Key
Bias Case Law, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1997, at Al, A24. "The highly unusual settlement .... should
end the case, which was pending before the high court and had the potential for a landmark ruling
restricting affirmative action." Id. at Al. The surprising settlement shows that civil rights leaders
feared that the Supreme Court, which was scheduled to hear the case on January 14, 1998, would rule
that race could not legally be considered a factor in "hiring, promotions and layoffs." See id. "The
Black Leadership Forum, which arranged the settlement, includes the leaders of the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund, the National Council of Negro Women, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference
and the Rev. Jesse Jackson's Operation PUSH." Id. at A24. "Critics of race-based affirmative action
said the big-money payoff shows desperation on the part of the old-line civil rights establishment." Id.
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presented the Supreme Court with an ideal lens through which to examine the
constitutionality of affirmative action. 5 However, as a result of industrious
manipulation, the Court narrowly missed that opportunity. 6 Because a live
controversy no longer exists, this Comment will focus on the Supreme Court's lost
chance to interpret the Constitution and articulate the appropriate legal principles
raised in Taxman." Although a case of similar content will inevitably reach the
Supreme Court, the Court's unavoidable and unfortunate silence regarding the
issues in Taxman necessitates an additional term where civil rights legislation lacks
a definitive mandate.'8 Taxman would likely have confirmed that Title VII and the
Constitution are currently in conflict and hence, require resolution. 9 Unfortu-
nately, that inevitable conclusion, along with true equality, must wait.
11. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
The Civil War Amendments were fundamentally important in establishing the
foundation for the modem paradigm of civil rights legislation.2"
Nearly fifty years after the adoption of the Civil War Amendments, the Court
refined the scope of the education system through a series of critically important
"[T]he Center for New Black Leadership, a young and conservative group, denounced the settlement
as a 'bribe' and a 'new low for the "civil rights" organizations."' Id. In fact, the president of that group
said, "[i]magine if, in 1954, wealthy white racists could have stopped the Supreme Court from hearing
the Brown v. Board of Ed. case by simply putting up a few hundred thousand dollars. This action by
the Black Leadership Forum is just as pernicious." Id. (italics added). However, Jesse Jackson rebutted
the criticism arguing that the settlement was "wise and good for the country." See id.
15. See infra notes 52-56 and accompanying text (discussing Taxman and Title VII).
16. See Savage, supra note 14 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 52-56 and accompanying text. Taxman's importance for the future of race
conscious policies was not underestimated. See John W. Borkowski, The 1996-97 Term of the United
States Supreme Court and Its Impact on Public Schools, 122 ED. LAW REP. 361, 362 (1998). "On the
last day of the 1996-97 Term, the Supreme Court granted certiori in Piscataway Township Board of
Education v. Taxman, a case that will likely be among the most important cases of the 1997-98 Term."
Id.
18. See infra note 63 and accompanying text (discussing the confusion among state legislatures and
Congress in drafting affirmative action policies).
19. See infra notes 108-14 and accompanying text.
20. The Thirteenth Amendment ends slavery by stating, "[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude,
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within
the United States or any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. The
Fourteenth Amendment requires that citizens of the United States shall have "due process of law" and
establishes that no person shall be denied the "equal protection of the laws." See U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1. The Fifteenth Amendment gives all men the right to vote regardless of their "race, color or
previous condition of servitude." U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. Each Amendment also provides that
Congress has the power to enforce through appropriate legislation. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2,
XIV, § 5, XV, § 2.
decisions.21 These cases invoked the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment,22 thereby declaring segregated schools to be unconstitutional.23
Almost twenty-five years later, the Supreme Court made another crucial
decision in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,24 in which the Court
rejected a white student's constitutional challenge under Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 19642" regarding the University of California at Davis Medical
School's policy of reserving sixteen positions exclusively for minority students. 26
Justice Powell, who wrote the opinion of the Court, referenced the First Amend-
ment in order to justify the holding that the state may look to race as a factor for
medical school admission due to the importance of a "robust exchange of ideas."27
Subsequent to Bakke, the Supreme Court decided another noteworthy case.
In United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,2" a white employee brought suit
against a steelworkers' union, claiming that the union's quota, which required fifty
percent minority employees, was discriminatory under Title VII.29 Weberrelied on
a strict interpretation of Title VII and argued that the policy was discriminatory
because it permitted junior level black employees to be promoted ahead of senior
level white employees, thus violating the language in Title VII.30 The Court held
that voluntary race-based affirmative actions policies do not violate Title VII.3
The Court in Weber thus expanded Title VII beyond the confines of its language
stating that although white employees are discriminated against "solely because
they are white ... a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within
the statute, [although it is] not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its
makers."32 The Court then examined Title VII against the "legislative history" and
21. See generally Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits segregated schools); Sweatt v. Painter, 339
U.S. 629,635-36 (1950) (holding that if a black law school is not equal to a white law school, the black
student must be admitted to the white law school); Missouri ex. Rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337,
352 (1938) (holding that black students must be admitted to white law schools if no black law schools
exist); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896) (holding that political equality is separate from
social equality, hence education facilities can be separate if equal), overruled by Brown, 347 U.S. 483.
22. The Fourteenth Amendment states in pertinent part, "No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States ... nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
23. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
24. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
26. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312.
27. See id. at 313. Justice Powell also determined that a "diverse student body" is a legitimate and
Constitutional directive for a university. See id. at 311-12.
28. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
29. See id. at 198-200. The union's goal was to require that fifty percent of those hired be black
until the number of black craftworkers was equivalent to the number of blacks in the "local labor force."
See id. at 199.
30. See id. at 199-200; see also supra note 2 and accompanying text (noting that an individual may
not be discriminated against in the workplace, under Title VII, on the basis of race).
31. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.
32. See id. at 201 (citation omitted).
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"historical context from which the Act arose."33 In order to weigh the amount of
racial discrimination permitted under Title VII's confines, the Court instituted a
two-tiered criterion.34 This criterion proposed first, that the purpose of affirmative
action plans could not "unnecessarily trammel the interests of white employees."35
Second, the plan would be required to "mirror those of the statute."36 In Weber, the
Court granted leeway to the affirmative action policy of the union because the plan
was temporary and had a definitive termination point.37
The Court made another landmark decision in Wygant v. Jackson Board of
Education (Board),38 where white employees brought suit against the Board for
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as
Title VII. 39 Specifically, the white employees claimed that the Board's policy of
giving minority preferences in employment retention was discriminatory.' In
Wygant, the Court delineated that general societal discrimination could not justify
the Board's policy and that the Board would need to show proof of prior
discrimination in order to grant preferences based on minority status." The Court
held that the Board's decision to layoff white employees as a "means to accomplish
even a valid purpose cannot satisfy the demands of the Equal Protection Clause."42
33. See id. The Court wrote that "Congress' primary concern in enacting the prohibition against
racial discrimination in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was with 'the plight of the Negro in
our economy."' Id. at 202 (quoting 110 Cong. Rec. 6548 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey)). After
examining the historical context surrounding the passage of Title VII, the Court wrote "we cannot agree
with respondent that Congress intended to prohibit the private sector from taking effective steps to
accomplish the goal that Congress designed Title VII to achieve." See id. at 204.
34. See id. at 208.
35. See id.
36. See id. The plan must be similar to the goal of Title VII which the Court examined from a
historical standpoint. See id.
37. See id. at 208-09. The Court noted that preferential selection of black employees over white
employees "will end as soon as the percentage of black skilled craftworkers ... approximates the
percentage of blacks in the local labor force." See id.
38. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
39. See id. at 272.
40. See id. at 273.
41. See id. at 274.
42. See id. at 284 (footnote omitted). The Court also noted that the Board's definition of a minority
includes "blacks, Orientals, American Indians, and persons of Spanish descent" but the Board never
explained why they chose those specific groups or attempted to prove that they discriminated against
those specific minority groups. See id. at n.13.
In 1996, "affirmative action suffered three major defeats... which collectively
signal[ed] the end of the preferential policies practiced [over] the last thirty
years."43 Hopwood v. Texas," Taxman v. Board of Education,45 and California's
Proposition 209,46 although indicating an end to affirmative action policies, also
served to exacerbate the confusion in the current state of civil rights
jurisprudence. 4' The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined in
Hopwood that racial classifications arejustified only in order to remedy the effects
of past discrimination. Thus, racial distinctions must be narrowly tailored in order
to legally achieve that important government purpose.48 In evaluating Hopwood,
the Fifth Circuit determined that "there ha[d] been no indication from the Supreme
Court, other than Justice Powell's lonely opinion in Bakke, that the state's interest
in diversity constitutes a compelling justification for governmental race-based
discrimination"; hence, the Fifth Circuit departed from the Bakke precedent.49 The
Fifth Circuit further found that the use of race to create diversity only created a
student body that appeared "different" and was "no more rational.., than would
be choices based upon the physical size or blood type of applicants."5 The
Hopwood Court clearly distinguished diversity from race."
43. Alt, supra note 6, at 179.
44. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
45. 91 F.3d 1547 (3rd Cir. 1996).
46. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31 (1996).
47. See generally Alt, supra note 6, at 179-80.
48. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 940-41. The Fifth Circuit examined Adarand Constructors v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200 (1995), the latest Supreme Court case discussing racial preferences, and concluded that
the strict scrutiny test applies to situations where race is a consideration for different treatment. See id.
at 941 n. 18. Observers of the Hopwood decision noted that the decision "sent shockwaves through the
world of higher education." See Michael S. Greve, Hopwood and Its Consequences, 17 PACE L. REV.
1 (1996) (footnote omitted). "Defenders of racial preferences have emphasized that Hopwood binds
only institutions inside the Fifth Circuit" and have argued that the Supreme Court has not yet dismissed
the rationale of diversity that Justice Powell's "lone opinion" in Bakke espouses. See id. at 2 (footnotes
omitted).
49. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 945. The Fifth Circuit noted that Justice Powell alone wrote that a
diverse student body is a basis for preferential treatment, hence that opinion was not a Supreme Court
mandate. See id. "Judge Jerry Smith's trenchant opinion for the Fifth Circuit-arguably the first
unambiguous, forthright judicial endorsement of official color blindness in three decades-has blown
a huge hole in the 'diversity' defense on which racial preferences in higher education have been based."
Greve, supra note 48, at 2-3. Some have argued that the Hopwood decision may be entirely ignored
as:
Racial preference policies... supported by entrenched bureaucracies and by powerful interest
groups. These constituencies have responded to Hopwood with a mixture of outrage, denial
and defiance .... Given the higher education establishment's iron commitment to racial
"diversity," universities need no such encouragement; one must frankly doubt that they will
readily comply with court-imposed restrictions on racial preference policies.
See id. at 3.
50. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 945.
51. See id.
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In Taxman, a white school teacher lost her teaching position in favor of a black
teacher of equal merit as an attempt by the school board to foster racial diversity
in the business department.12 The Court of Appeals determined, as stipulated by
the school board, that this affirmative action policy did not "act to remedy the
effects of past employment discrimination."53 Additionally, both parties agreed that
minorities were not under-represented in the school and that racial discrimination
was not a specific problem in their school district that required a remedy.54 Hence,
the court determined that, under Title VII, affirmative action plans which are non-
remedial cannot justify ignoring the powerful anti-discrimination mandate of Title
VII. 5 Essentially, the holding in Taxman strengthened Title VII's purpose as a
statute designed to remedy the effects of past discrimination. Title VII does not
permit discrimination as a means of promoting diversity.56
Then, in November 1996, California voters passed the California Civil Rights
Initiative or Proposition 209, 5" which established that "[t]he state shall not
discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on
the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public
employment, public education, or public contracting.""8 Proposition 209 "stands
unique in the affirmative action debate as a popular initiative, rather than a
legislative act or a judicial dictate of the court."59 Robert D. Alt, the Director of
Public Relations and Education at the Center for Individual Rights and who also
served as co-counsel to Cheryl Hopwood, 6 noted that citizens of California voted
to end race and gender based preferences despite "an extravagant scare
campaign. ' 61 Ironically, Proposition 209, which promotes equal protection of all
52. See Taxman v. Board of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547, 1551-52 (3rd Cir. 1996). The Superintendent
stated, "In my own personal perspective I believe by retaining Mrs. Williams it was sending a very clear
message that we feel that our staff should be culturally diverse .... Id. at 1552.
53. See id. at 1563.
54. See id. at 1550-51.
55. See id. at 1563. Further, the court determined that the Weber two-prong test was not satisfied
because there was no termination point and the policy "unnecessarily trammel[s] the interests of the
[non-minority] employees." See id. at 1565 (alteration in original) (quoting language from Weber
discussed supra notes 28-37 and accompanying text).
56. See id. at 1557. The court wrote, "the very purpose of Title VII is to promote hiring on the basis
of job qualifications, rather than on the basis of race or color." Id. The court further noted that "there
is no congressional recognition of diversity as a Title Vn objective requiring accommodation." Id. at
1558. But see supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's decision in Weber
which focused on the historical rationale for Title VII).
57. Proposition 209 passed by a vote of 54% to 46%. See Elections '96 State Propositions, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 7, 1996, at A29.
58. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31 (1996).
59. Alt, supra note 6, at 180.
60. See id. at 179.
61. See id. at 180.
people by forbidding any discrimination based on race, was attacked "as a violation
of equal protection. '"62
The division among the various state legislatures highlights the division of
opinions regarding the future of affirmative action in America.63 Both the United
States Congress and state legislatures are actively drafting and debating new
affirmative action legislation.' At present, there is little consensus regarding the
future of racial preferences, a fact which underscores the need for a definitive
judicial opinion by the Court.65
III. LEGAL ARGUMENTS
A. The Constitution and Title VII
1. The Constitution Clearly Prohibits Racial Preferences
"To interpret a statute designed to give greater remedy to Constitutional
discrimination as authorizing discrimination contrary to the Constitution is surely
flawed."'  Title VII, which has been interpreted to permit race conscious
affirmative action policies,67 clearly contradicts the language in the Constitution,
which does not permit discrimination based on race.68 The Constitution of the
United States explicitly states that no person shall be denied "equal protection of
the laws. '69 To treat people differently based solely on race certainly defies the
62. See id. n. 10. "The very idea that an initiative passed to prohibit discrimination and to promote
equal protection would be challenged as a violation of equal protection defies both logic and the law."
Id.
63. See Hall, supra note 8, at 960. "While twenty states have introduced bills or resolutions to limit
or ban affirmative action, sixteen states have introduced bills to strengthen or expand their affirmative
action programs." Id.
64. See id.
65. Taxman would have provided the Court with its first opportunity to examine voluntary
affirmative action in over 10 years. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text (examining the legal
issues in Taxman).
66. Brief Amici Curiae of the Institute for Justice and Campaign for a Color-Blind America in
Support of Respondent at *11, Taxman v. Board of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547 (3rd Cir. 1996) (No. 96-679),
available in 1997 WL 626045 [hereinafter Amici Curiae Brief in Support of Respondent].
67. See Weber, supra notes 28-37 and accompanying text.
68. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also infra note 70 and accompanying text.
69. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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term "equal."7
The Declaration of Independence, commonly regarded as "America's first and
foremost statement of equal protection principles" adds clarification to the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.71 The Declaration of Independence
states: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these
are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights,
Governments are instituted among Men...."72 Supporters of affirmative action,
"[r]ather than recognizing the need for government to protect rights
equally-without regard to race-rely on [the] government to grant rights and
privileges (in the form of preferences) specifically on the basis of race."73 This
idea, however, is specifically prohibited by both the Constitution and the
Declaration of Independence.74
70. See generally Scott L. Olson, Comment, The Case AgainstAffirmative Action in the Admissions
Process, 58 U. Prrr. L. REV. 991, 1013 (1997). Olson notes that,
The Fourteenth Amendment states that all people should be treated equally. If the drafters of
the Amendment intended to treat one person differently than another, using the term "equal"
would be frivolous. "Equality" means "under the same conditions and among persons
similarly situated;" it does not mean that one group should be treated differently and a
preference should be given to the disadvantage of another group, whether that disadvantaged
group is black or white.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in the original).
71. See Alt, supra note 6, at 183.
72. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). See generally Alt, supra note 6,
at 183. "When the Declaration states that all men are created equal, it speaks not to equality in physical
stature, talents, or property, but to the possession of rights." Id. "According to the Declaration of
Independence, the equal protection of these natural rights is the very reason for the institution of
government." Id.
73. See Alt, supra note 6, at 183-84. Robert Alt argues that affirmative action policies are
inherently illogical, noting,
To treat someone differently - in this case to grant a preference-based upon the probability
of an outcome arising from an individual's membership in a group is logically consistent with
an officer who pulls over a black individual on suspicion of trafficking crack cocaine simply
because the overwhelming majority of individuals sentenced for that crime are black.
See id. at 190 (footnote omitted).
74. See generally John Marquez Lundin, The Callfor a Color-Blind Law, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
PROBS. 407,453 (1997) (discussing that "[olur national ideal of equality before the law has been with
us from the beginning").
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2. Congress Does Not Have the Authority to Alter the Constitution
In the landmark case Marbury v. Madison,75 the Supreme Court held that the
Constitution cannot be altered by Congress.76 In its most recent term, the Supreme
Court ruled in City of Boerne v. Flores,77 that "Congress does not enforce a
constitutional right by changing what the right is. [Congress] has been given the
power 'to enforce,' not the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional
violation. 7' As noted by the Court in Flores, "If Congress could define its own
powers by altering the Fourteenth Amendment's meaning, no longer would the
Constitution be 'superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means.' It
would be 'on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts.... alterable
when the legislature shall please to alter it." 79 A rich legal precedent supports the
supremacy and finality of the Constitution.
3. Title VII and the Rise of Affirmative Action
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states that an employer cannot "fail
or refuse to hire" or to "discharge any individual" or discriminate with respect to
"compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."8" Thus, the Civil Rights
Act explicitly prohibits discrimination based on race.8 However, many argued that
the statute was meaningless and that "[g]overnment should take positive steps to
achieve real, not merely formal, equality." 2 It was this proposition that heralded
the first uses of affirmative action. 3 The Supreme Court ruled in 1971 that
government "may do what is necessary to achieve the compelling interest of
eliminating the effect of past constitutional violations."' The Court again ruled in
Bakke that race-based affirmative action plans were justified only if they furthered
important governmental objectives.8 5 In Weber, the Court expanded Title VII
75. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
76. See id. at 177.
77. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
78. See id. at 2164.
79. Amici Curiae Brief in Support of Respondent at *6, Taxman v. Board of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547
(3rd Cir. 1996) (No. 96-679) (quoting Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2168 (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177)),
available in 1997 WL 626045.
80. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (1994).
81. See id.
82. See Donald L. Beschle, "You've Got to be Carefully Taught": Justifying Affirmative Action
After Croson and Adarand, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1141, 1149 (1996) (examining the Supreme Court's
decision in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971)).
83. See id.
84. Id. at 1150.
85. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978);'see also supra notes 24-27 and
accompanying text (discussing Bakke).
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beyond the confines of its language and examined its meaning in a historical
context.86 From that basis, the Court determined that Title VII was established to
prohibit discrimination against "historically disadvantaged groups";87 hence, Title
VII could be used to remedy the "plight of the Negro in our economy."88 Title VII
was thus interpreted by the courts to allow the government to enact affirmative
action policies.89
B. What Standard Should the Court Apply?
1. Diversity as a Compelling State Interest
Supporters of affirmative action argue that both the Constitution and Title VII
allow the use of racial preferences to increase ethnic diversity among faculty,
students, and employees.'
Supporters claimed that the furtherance of diversity was consistent with both
the Constitution and Title VII because it did not "unduly interfere with the rights
of non-minority employees."'" Congress "acknowledged the importance of
combating stereotypes and misconceptions among students in order to prevent
future discrimination"; hence, the rationale that diversity is a sufficiently
compelling interest to justify preferences is somewhat persuasive.92 Likewise,
86. See supra notes 28-37 and accompanying text.
87. See Cunningham, supra-note 2, at 446.
88. See United Steelworkers of Am. V. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202 (1979) (quoting 110 Cong. Rec.
6548 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey)).
89. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
90. See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union, the ACLU of New Jersey,
the National Employment Lawyers Association, the Rainbow PUSH Coalition, Americans United for
Affirmative Action, and People for the American Way in Support of Petitioner, Taxman v. Board of
Educ., 91 F.3d 1547 (3rd Cir. 1996) (No. 96-679), available in 1997 WL 528610 [hereinafter Brief
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner].
91. See id. at *12 (citing Weber, 443 U.S. at 208).
92. See id. at * 15. In the case of Sharon Taxman, the ACLU stated that "one of the most important
lessons that the American public schools teach is that the diverse ethnic, cultural and national
backgrounds that have been brought together in our famous 'melting pot' do not identify essential
differences among the human beings that inhabit our land." Id. at *22. The ACLU further argued that
"[elvidence from educators and social scientists ... [show that] a diverse faculty enhances the
education provided to students." Id. Proponents of affirmative action therefore support the Piscataway
school board's decision to retain a black school teacher to the detriment of a white schoolteacher. See
supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text. However, this view, according to critics of affirmative
action, poses a potential danger because people inevitably argue "that if you are not my color, you are
not qualified to police me, to represent me, or to judge me; you do not know my experiences, and
therefore you lack legitimacy." See Alt, supra note 6, at 189.
proponents of affirmative action argue that racial preferences are valid only when
a compelling state interest is satisfied.93
A line of cases that look to a compelling state interest in order to justify racial
preferences supports affirmative action policies.94 Bakke95 and Weber96 are among
these cases.
2. Affirmative Action to Remedy the Effects of Past Discrimination
In its 1986 consideration of Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,97 the
Court determined that a state's use of race-based preferences could be justified
only when a compelling interest was at stake.98 The plurality decision determined
that a compelling interest exists only when an affirmative action policy seeks to
remedy prior discrimination."
In Johnson v. Transportation Agency,1 ° "Justice O'Connor observed that in
enacting Title VII, Congress sought to balance two concerns: [(1)] the rooting out
of invidious discrimination on the basis of race or gender, and [(2)] the elimination
of lasting effects of past discrimination."'' Simply stated, affirmative action is
justified when its purpose is solely remedial; it cannot be justified when used for
the purpose of enhancing or furthering general societal goals.'02
3. Strict Scrutiny Analysis
The Court wrote that "all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a
single racial group are immediately suspect," and as such, are subject to the highest
possible level of scrutiny.'03 In determining which affirmative action policies are
93. See Brief Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at *21, Taxman (No. 96-679), available in
1997 WL 528610.
94. See supra notes 24-42 and accompanying text.
95. See generally Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (holding that
race may be a factor in admission to medical school to increase the "robust exchange of ideas"); supra
notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
96. See generally Weber, 443 U.S. at 208 (holding that affirmative action can be permitted if it
mirrors the purpose of Title VII and does not "unnecessarily trammel the interests of white employees");
supra notes 28-37 and accompanying text.
97. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
98. See id. at 273-74.
99. See id. at 277. Justice Powell wrote in order for affirmative action to be justified, there must
be "sufficient evidence to justify the conclusion that there has been prior discrimination." See id.
100. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
101. BriefAmici Curiae in Support of Respondent at '15, Taxman v. Board of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547
(3rd Cir. 1996) (No. 96-679) (explaining Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Johnson and reaffirming
her belief that affirmative action must exist only to remedy prior discrimination), available in 1997
WL 616045.
102. See id.
103. Lundin, supra note 74, at 418 (examining Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944),
which was the first case to apply the strict scrutiny standard).
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remedial, the Court has stated that "[plublic decisions that promote vague
conceptions of diversity are not remedial.""' The Court also determined in
Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 5 that even "benign" racial classifications are
subject to strict scrutiny." 6 Not only does this decision serve to reject racial
classifications as a permissible mechanism for increasing diversity, but it also
reconfirms the Court's continuing skepticism of such tactics. 07
4. Conflicting Standards
The Court has examined racial preferences under both the Fourteenth
Amendment and Title VII.'s Depending on which premise is employed to analyze
affirmative action policies, "the Court has developed two distinct analytical
frameworks."'" For actions based on the Constitution, the Court applies the strict
scrutiny standard." Strict scrutiny not only requires satisfaction of a compelling
government interest, but also requires the "showing of specific instances of past
discrimination in order for government to apply race-based preferences.""'
When the Court examines Title VII cases, it requires only "a lawful purpose
and de minimis infringement on the rights of non-minorities. To date, the Court
has not clearly defined what conditions satisfy its requirement of a lawful
purpose.""..2
The Court determined that a statute cannot alter the text of the Constitution." 3
Therefore, the Court will likely insist that Title VII conform to the constitutional
standard requiring strict scrutiny." 4
104. See BriefAmici Curiae in Support of Respondent at *24, Taxman (No. 96-679), available in
1997 WL 626045. Douglas Kmiec, counsel of record for amici curiae in support of Sharon Taxman,
also noted that when the Court examined Wygant it determined that the "role model" justification for
affirmative action is not remedial. See id. Additionally, there is no logical stopping point for
affirmative action policies when they seek only to better society rather than remedying past
discrimination. See id. "As a constitutional matter, there are no 'justifications beyond' because all such
rationalizations prove to be a denial of the Constitutions' color-blind standard." Id. at *24.
105. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
106. See id. at 227-28.
107. See id. at 227.
108. See supra notes 66-74 and accompanying text.
109. See Henry Schuldinger, Note, Still Searching For the Limits of the Permissible Use of
Affirmative Action: United States v. Board of Education of the Township of Piscataway, 6 GEO.
MASON U. Cr. RTS. L.J. 97, 98 (1996).
110. See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
111. See Schuldinger, supra note 109, at 98 (footnote omitted).
112. See id.
113. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text (discussingMarbury and Flores, which establish
that the Constitution is unchangeable and unalterable by the legislature).
iv. IMPACTS AND ALTERNATIVES
A. Impacts
1. Increased Social Debate
Jesse Jackson, Ward Connerly, Pete Wilson, President Clinton and a host of
other prominent political figures have increased social dialogue on issues
concerning affirmative action. "5 In fact, President Clinton went so far as to pledge
an unprecedented "dialogue" on race relations in America." 6 As part of this
promise, President Clinton and Vice President Gore recently unveiled a new civil
rights initiative which seeks stronger enforcement of already existing federal anti-
discrimination laws.' 17
As part of the heated battle between affirmative action proponents and foes,
the words of the pioneering civil rights leader, Martin Luther King, Jr., have
commonly been used both to give support and to denounce affirmative action."'
Jesse Jackson marched in opposition to California's Proposition 209, a state-wide
voter initiative that made it illegal for the state to base decisions on consideration
of skin color." 9 Jackson argued that he supports racial preferences in an effort to
make society more "inclusive"; however, a newspaper noted that the "racial
preferences he was defending were those that until recently excluded many high-
115. See infra notes 118-21 and accompanying text (noting the heated debate surrounding
affirmative action policies).
116. See Rochelle Sharpe, Stark Transformation: Asian-Americans Advance in U.S. Business
Program, ASIAN WALL STREET J., Sept. 10, 1997, at 1, available in 1997 WL-WSJA 11016015.
President Clinton's pledge has not been met with unqualified support. See William Neikirk, Clinton's
Race Initiative Being Labeled as Divisive: Some of President's Supporters Urging More Open
Dialogue, CHI. TRwB., Dec. 14, 1997, at 3, available in 1997 WL 16802799. "Liberals and
conservatives alike have expressed disappointment with the president's national 'conversation' on race
while some of Clinton's advisers fear that the initiative could wind up being counterproductive." Id.
Other comments include, "'I think this whole process is tearing people apart, and not putting people
back together again .... " Id.
117. See infra notes 159-72 and accompanying text.
118. Jesse Jackson recently attacked Governor Pete Wilson and Proposition 209 supporters for their
use of Martin Luther King's famous dream speech. See Jesse Jackson, Where Would King Walk in
California?, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1997, at M5.
Gov. Pete Wilson and his retainers did not march with King. They were not at Montgomery.
They were not bloodied at Selma. These propagandists invoke King's dream-of an America
where one day all of God's children will be judged not by the color of their skin but the content
of their character-to justify an attack on U.S. civil rights laws. They suggest that King would
support measures such as California Proposition 209 ....
Id. Jackson wrote that if Martin Luther King were alive today, "he would be leading the march to save
the dream and stop the assault on the nation's civil rights laws in California." See id.
119. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text (discussing generally Proposition 209).
[Vol. 26: 589, 1999] Affirmative Action and the Constitution
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
achieving Asian-American students from the University of California-in order to
make room for lower-scoring African Americans and Hispanics."' 2 °
The question of who should be included, and at what cost to other groups,
continues to perplex many. Undeniably, there is a bitter irony in the social debate
that has followed both the controversial cases regarding affirmative action and
California's Proposition 209.121
2. Changes in Minority Education
Following Proposition 209 and Hopwood,'22 Jesse Jackson wrote that a "racial
cleansing of incoming classes of the law and medical schools" has occurred. 
23
Although minority enrollment at the University of California at Berkeley's Boalt
Hall Law School did decline, this was not a universal consensus."2 While
"[e]ighty percent fewer [African Americans] and [fifty] percent fewer Hispanics
were admitted" to Boalt Hall after racial preferences were discontinued, 25 a "little-
reported" and surprising finding was made this year as the Law School Admission
Council reported that "[flirst-year minority student enrollments in ABA-approved
120. See Whose Dream Is It? Preferences Preclude an Inclusive Society, COLUMBUS DISPATCH,
Sept. 11, 1997, at A14 (noting that the civil rights movement is often seen as espousing "contradictory
goals") [hereinafter, Preferences Preclude].
121. "San Francisco Mayor Willie Brown ... likened Proposition 209, which forbids racial
discrimination, to the Jim Crow laws that once mandated discrimination throughout the South. In other
words, Brown, who wants the state to be able to discriminate on the basis of race, says that to abolish
such discrimination would be like returning to a system in which the state was able to discriminate on
the basis of race." Id.
122. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text (discussing the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Hopwood).
123. See Preferences Preclude, supra note 120, at A14.
124. The Law School Admission Council reported that Hispanic students admitted to law school has
increased from 5.7 percent to 5.8 percent, "African-American first-year students remained the same,
while Native-Americans declined, from 0.9 percent to 0.8 percent. Asian-Americans increased from
6.3 percent to 6.5 percent." See Di Mari Ricker, The Changing Face of Legal Education?, STUDENT
LAW., Dec. 1997, at 22. Many believed that affirmative action may reduce the number of minority
students, but only for a short length of time. See Greve, supra note 48, at 20-21. "Affirmative action
advocates are correct that the demise of racial preferences will (at least in the short term) reduce the
number of blacks and, to a lesser extent, of Hispanics in elite institutions." Id. However, according to
some, this is not entirely negative because "[tihe beneficiaries of racial preferences, as heretofore
administered, will not drop out of higher education; they will attend other institutions, where they are
more likely to compete and succeed." See id. at 21 (footnote omitted). "While lower minority
representation in elite schools will be a social loss, a reduction of the 'diversity' induced mismatch
between minority students and institutions of higher learning would improve minority graduation rates,
and students and their prospective employers will be more confident that minority graduates are not
quota products."' Id. (footnote omitted).
125. See Ricker, supra note 124, at 21.
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law schools nationwide showed a slight increase" from the previous enrollment
period.'26 Medical schools in California report that contrary to the fears of many,
the number of African American and Hispanic medical students has not diminished
as a result of Proposition 209, but has actually increased. 2 7 Texas state medical
schools also report that "[m]inority enrollment... appears to be rebounding after
a 1997 slide blamed on a court ordered ban on affirmative action" in Texas.128 The
increase in minority numbers in Texas is especially noteworthy because the
standard for admission actually increased following the decision in Hopwood.
129
It seems that the implementation of Hopwood in Texas and Proposition 209 in
California have not had the effect predicted by Jesse Jackson. 3 '
3. Re-Invigorated Search for Alternatives
As a result of recent court battles and public initiatives, debate has been
stimulated and policy-makers have begun to look for alternatives to replace
affirmative action. Such debate fosters an increased awareness of the social and
racial problems which continue to plague our nation.
Unfortunately, discussion and debate alone cannot fix America's inequalities.
A lesson from "Dr. King's life is that racism cannot be undone by national
conversations.'' Instead, racism must "be defeated one conflict at a time."'32
Those conflicts must be isolated, defined, and solved.
126. See id. (emphasis in original). The survey showed that at ABA-accredited law schools, "20.7
percent of this year's entering students are minorities; in the fall of 1996, that figure was 20.5 percent."
See id.
127. See The Admissions Question, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 22, 1998, available in 1998 WL
2365399. The Christian Science Monitor reported that unlike California law schools, medical schools
and "most other graduate programs in the University of California system.., have not seen anything
like the same drop-off in minority enrollments one year into the restructured admissions standards,
which exclude ethnic preferences. In the med schools, the numbers of black and Hispanic students have
remained steady, or increased slightly." See id.
128. See Jeanne Russell, Minority Enrollment Up in State's Medical Schools, SAN ANTONIO
ExPREss-NEWS, Jan. 22, 1998, at 3B.
129. See id. "The grade-point average of students accepted in 1997 was 3.66, compared with 3.64
in 1998 .... In pre-Hopwood 1996, the average was 3.60." Id. (italics added).
130. See generally George Cantor, Affirmative Action Debate Really Focuses on Prestige, DETROrr
NEWS, Dec. 13, 1997, at C6. "[I]n the California university system, only at Berkeley was there a
massive outcry when Proposition 209 passed. At the San Diego campus (the seventh best public
university in America, according to the authoritative U.S. News & World Report ratings), black
enrollment actually went up 48 percent after 209 passed." Id.




[Vol. 26: 589,1999] Affirmative Action and the Constitution
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
B. Alternatives
If affirmative action is abolished entirely, we as a society must search for new
alternatives. It is critical that the fundamental problems, which have caused many
to look to affirmative action as a solution, be addressed. 133
In a recent speech, Vice President Al Gore spoke out against those who
naively believe that our nation is truly color-blind." He noted that although the
disparity between African American earnings and Caucasian earnings has been
reduced by fifty percent, "the wealth of [African American] and Hispanic
households still averages less than one-tenth that of white households."' 135
Additionally, although the difference between African American and Caucasian
high school graduation rates has virtually been eliminated, the "drop-out rate
among Hispanic Americans is still eight points higher, with barely half finishing
high school, and far fewer going on to college." 136 Educational opportunities for
minorities are often limited by poor educational facilities and resources. 37 Such
problems must be eliminated. However, it is imperative to recognize that the
solutions to these crises do not come in the form of discriminatory preferences, but
instead require new and innovative alternatives.
1. Better Education
The nation must revitalize its commitment to educate every student in America
regardless of the student's racial classification. As one commentator noted, the
133. See generally Cedric Merlin Powell, Blinded By Color: The New Equal Protection, The Second
Deconstruction, and Affirmative Action, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 191 (1997). Powell noted that in
America's "search to find ways to move quickly to equal opportunity," America developed affirmative
action. See id. at 192. The purpose of affirmative action was to "address the systemic exclusion of
individuals of talent, on the basis of their gender or race, from opportunities to develop, perform,
achieve and contribute." See id. Affirmative action functioned to "open the doors of education,
employment, and business development opportunities to qualified individuals who happen to be
members of groups that have experienced long-standing and persistent discrimination." See id.
(footnote omitted). While these goals were admirable and necessary, Professor Powell further wrote that
"[dliscrimination does not justify preferential treatment, but I want to know that the person who stands
with me against preferences understands the problem that inspired them." See id. at 193 (footnote
omitted). It is imperative that society address and remedy the problems leading so many to support
preferential treatment.
134. See The White House: Remarks by Vice President Al Gore, M2 PRESSWIRE, Jan. 21, 1998,
available in 1998 WIL 5046654 [hereinafter Remarks by Gore].
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See infra notes 138-48 and accompanying text.
problem of sub-standard education is often seen in inner-city neighborhoods. 138
Such schools have "far fewer experienced teachers than suburban schools and few
computers or other valuable teaching tools" which result in less educational
opportunities for many minority students. 39 Before students enter college, this
nation must address the inequalities that occur in the classrooms which limit the
success of minority students.""4 Robert Berdahl, the Chancellor at the University
of California at Berkeley recently stated, "[w]e know, from an abundance of
sources, that educational opportunities are not anywhere near equal-not in funding,
not in facilities, not in teacher experience and not in access to college preparatory
classes.'' It seems apparent that the nation's appalling inequalities 4' can be
traced to educational disparities between Caucasian students and minorities. 43 For
example, "on average, [an African American twelfth] grader reads almost four
years behind the average Caucasian student.""' As a consequence, it is clear that
affirmative action policies, including those which promote preferential treatment
and quotas, do not remedy the underlying problem of the American educational
system.'45 As a prominent educator notes, "'It is not an exaggeration to say the
process of selection of who will go to college begins in the first grade. With each
passing year, students denied equal access to challenging classes and ultimately to
college-prep courses see their chances of college admission decline.""146 It is unfair
to expect students from unsafe schools with poor facilities and less qualified
teachers to adequately compete with students from more privileged backgrounds. "'
To effectively create a just educational system, affirmative action policies
138. See Myriam Marquez, Seeking Equal Opportunity ForAll, ST. LOUIS POsT-DISPATCH, Jan. 21,
1998, at C7, available in 1998 WL 3314837.
139. See id.
140. See Thaai Walker, UC Chancellor Puts Focus on Poor Kids, He Warns that Better Schools
Needed, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 24, 1998, at A14, available in 1998 WL 3905632. Chancellor Berdahl
warned that "public universities will become increasingly segregated unless equal education
opportunities are provided to poor and minority students from kindergarten on." See id.
141. See id.
142. See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text (discussing the unequal distribution of wealth
between minority and non-minority households).
143. See Abigail Thernstrom, Going Toe to Toe with Bill: The Conservative Who Sparred with
Clinton over Race on What She Didn't Get a Chance to Say About Affirmative Action, NEWSWEEK,
Dec. 15, 1997, at 35, available in 1997 WL 13931772.
144. See id.
145. See generally Maimion Schwarzschild, The Prop. 209 Debate Continues-Will the LawBe Put
Into Practice, SAN DIEGO UNION & TRiB., Sept. 14, 1997, at G3, available in 1997 WL 3154274.
Schwarzschild further notes that, "[a] spoils system of quotas and preferences is a sad counterfeit of
social justice. Real social justice requires, first and foremost, a rigorous, non-watered-down system of
education-kindergarten thru [twelfth] grade and higher-that opens the door of individual opportunity
to all." Id.
146. Walker, supra note 140, at A14 (quoting Robert Berdahl, University of California at Berkley's
Chancellor).
147. See id. Chancellor Berdahl stated, "if poor and minority students are most likely to be saddled
with unsafe schools and less qualified teachers, how can we ever expect those students to perform
equally with more advantaged students?" Id.
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cannot be used as a crutch; schools must instead be improved such that every
student in America, regardless of race or gender, may benefit equally.'48
2. Outreach Programs
Assuming that the Court determines that strict scrutiny analysis should be
applied and affirmative action may only be used to remedy past discrimination,'49
outreach programs will remain feasible. Outreach programs are those which
attempt to "diversify the pool from which selections are made by reaching out to
minorities."' 5 ° Importantly, programs designed to seek out qualified minority
applicants would likely survive the Court's strict scrutiny analysis because
preferential hiring or admissions would not be granted. 5' Outreach programs do
not guarantee that a minority will receive preference in being hired or admitted, but
simply serve to "diversify the pool of qualified persons" under consideration.' 52
Information concerning opportunities to groups traditionally unaware would serve
to increase the participation of such under-represented groups."'
The Department of Justice, in its analysis of Adarand,'54 stated that:
148. See id.
149. See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text (discussing the holdings in Wygant and
Johnson).
150. See Oppenheimer, supra note 7, at 931. To understand why outreach is necessary consider
the following hypothetical:
An employer may find that it is hiring largely by word of mouth, and thus limiting its searches
to those persons friendly with or related to its current employees. Given typical patterns of
residential, social and familial segregation, if its workforce is largely white, it will be
perpetuated as largely white.
Id.
151. See generally Beschle, supra note 82, at 1177-78.
152. See Margaret E. Montoya, Of "Subtle Prejudices," White Supremacy, andAffirmative Action:
A Reply to Paul Butler, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 891, 910 (1997) (rebutting: the controversial essay, Paul
Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J.
677 (1995), which discussed racially based jury nullification and the criminal justice system).
153. Programs to help minority high school students learn about a certain school's admission
requirements or programs to inform minority groups about "employment, career or promotional
opportunities" may help to increase awareness. See Oppenheimer, supra note 7, at 931-32.
154. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
Mere outreach and recruitment efforts... typically should not be subject to the
Adarand standards. Indeed, post Croson cases indicate that such efforts are
considered race-neutral means of increasing minority opportunity. In some sense,
of course, the targeting of minorities through outreach and recruitment campaigns
involves race-conscious action. But the objective there is to expand the pool of
applicants or bidders to include minorities, not to use race or ethnicity in the actual
decision. If the government does not use racial or ethnic classifications in selecting
persons from the expanded pool, Adarand ordinarily would be inapplicable. 55
As an example, one can look to the extensive educational outreach programs
in California which actively attempt to bridge the gap between privileged and
disadvantaged students.5 6 California's programs provide extensive tutoring for
students in disadvantaged schools in order to increase academic achievement, as
well as workshops to assist teachers in the classroom.' 57 Educational outreach
programs are only one way to reach students who are traditionally disadvantaged.
The Chancellor of the University of California at Los Angeles is careful to note
that outreach programs are "long-term solution[s]" not immediate remedies. '
Upon close examination of racial inequality, it seems apparent that long-term
solutions are what is needed to solve this problem.
3. Enforcement of Existing Civil Rights Legislation
Enforcement of federal civil rights law is the keystone of any successful move
toward real equality.'59 "The first step toward the goal of achieving a color-blind
law is a strict enforcement of anti-discrimination laws.""W The Constitution
explicitly states that all are equal before the law. 6' Furthermore, modem statutes
delineate that race cannot be used as a basis for discrimination.
162
Anti-discrimination methods could take several forms. 63 First, employers
155. S. Jenell Trigg, Comment, The Federal Communications Commission's Equal Opportunity
Employment Program and the Effect of Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 4 COMM LAW CONSPECTUS
237, 246 (summer 1996) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting, Memorandum from Walter
Dellinger, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, United States Dept. of Justice,
to all Agency General Counsel (June 28, 1995) (footnotes omitted)).
156. See Julie Chao, UC Outreach to Double Spending Regents Seek Funds to Promote Minority
Recruitment, S.F. EXAMINER, Jan. 16, 1998, at A2, available in 1998 WL 5176642.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See Lundin, supra note 74, at 457.
160. Id.
161. See supra notes 3 and 68 and accompanying text (discussing the Constitution).
162. See supra notes 80-89 and accompanying text (discussing Title VII).
163. See Oppenheimer, supra note 7, at 932. Techniques may include, "(1) anti-discrimination or
non-discrimination policies distributed to employees; (2) complaint resolution procedures aimed at
preventing or rapidly remedying discrimination; and (3) diversity training, sensitivity training and
sexual harassment training for employees and management to promote cross-racial and cross-gender
understanding in the workplace." See id.
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could be informed that discrimination on the basis of race or gender is illegal."
Second, better and more efficient methods for enforcement of existing law could
be devised. 65 It is critical that those who engage in discriminatory practices be
severely punished.166 "The legal mandate for strict enforcement of anti-discrimina-
tion laws is clear and must be used to ensure that individuals who suffer from racial
discrimination are made whole and that individuals who discriminate on the basis
of race are called to account."167
President Clinton and Vice President Gore recently announced a plan which
attempts to address many of these issues. 68  The initiative seeks to increase
enforcement of existing federal legislation prohibiting discrimination.'69  If
Congress approves the initiative, civil rights funding would increase by seventeen
percent.170 Currently, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is
backlogged with thousands of complaints based on discriminatory practices in the
work force. 7' President Clinton and Vice President Gore's initiative would
"reduce the EEOC's caseload backlog by more than half by [the year] 2000 and cut
the average time it takes to process cases by a third."172 Federal laws prohibiting
racial discrimination currently exist; however, when unenforced, the words of the
statutes are meaningless. A plan to vigorously enforce already existing federal
anti-discrimination laws deserves support from everyone.
164. See id.
165. See id.
166.. See Lundin, supra note 74, at 457.
167. Id.
168. See Remarks by Gore, supra note 134. Vice President Gore, during an emotional speech to
honor Martin Luther King Jr., announced that as part of President Clinton's dialogue on race, they were
proposing "the largest single increase in the enforcement of our civil rights laws in nearly two decades."
See id. Gore continued his remarks by stating that the new legislation will attempt to "prevent
discrimination before it occurs, and punish those who do discriminate." See id. While the legislation
exists, it does little good if not enforced. See id.; see also Teeth for Anti-Bias Laws, L.A. TiMEs, Jan.
21, 1998, at B6 [hereinafter Teeth]. Nearly everyone in America wants equal opportunities regardless
of their race, "and in this nation of laws that should be assured. But like the speed limit, such laws
mean nothing unless they are strictly enforced, so a proposal by the Clinton administration to boost civil
rights enforcement could make a real difference." See id.
169. See Teeth, supra note 168, at B6.
170. See id. The budget would increase from $516 million to $602 million. See id.
171. See id.
172. See Editorial, ATLANTA CONST., Jan. 21, 1998, at A8, available in 1998 WL 3672915.
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V. CONCLUSION
Preferential treatment based on race violates fundamental principles
established by the Constitution.173 Although affirmative action narrowly missed
review during this Supreme Court term,'74 the issue will inevitably arise again in
the future. Although race-based policies most likely will not survive judicial
scrutiny,"' every attempt must be made to effectively eliminate discrimination."'
It is indeed unfortunate that affirmative action has evolved from a well-
intentioned tool designed to combat racism into a vague and poorly articulated
masterpiece of political wrangling. In can be argued that in its modem form,
affirmative action is certainly no less dangerous than the discrimination it purports
to remedy. Inasmuch as it would be both unreasonable and unenlightened to
advocate discrimination as an acceptable societal norm, so too would it be
unreasonable to expect that society could long endure as a mosaic of peoples held
together, not by mutual respect, but by an ever proliferative system of quotas and
preferences.' 77 Social justice cannot be legislated in piecemeal fashion. As the
Constitution assures, and as the people concur, diversity and tolerance are among
the critical defining points of our country. As a nation we must live together in
peace and security because we, as a society, demand it of ourselves. To relegate
the American people to tolerate based solely on affirmative action would
unequivocally subjugate the spirit of equality which our forefathers fought to
ensure. Systems that seek to micro-manage diversity cannot claim to foster the
oneness of our nation, and as such, amount to nothing more than tyranny. This
tyranny is perhaps most blatantly evidenced by the recent tide of racial tension
within the country.
It is disheartening that "race relations" have become something of a taboo
topic among the politically astute. As a people, we have become polarized by
extremists who lack the foresight to know that real solutions can only come from
fair and equitable discourse regarding issues of racial liberty. This polarization of
the few has had the effect of silencing the many who have the capacity to envision
a world free of color lines, but who fear the reprisals of the polarized. Who can be
173. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (examining the unusual settlement of Taxman).
175. See supra notes 159-72 and accompanying text (analyzing existing anti-discrimination law).
176. See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text (noting that race conscious decisions are subject
to a strict scrutiny standard).
177. Justice O'Connor, examining the mosaic of peoples living in America, wrote that,
We are a Nation not of black and white alone, but one teeming with divergent communities
knitted together by various traditions and carried forth, above all, by individuals. Upon that
basis, we are governed by one Constitution, providing a single guarantee of equal protection,
one that extends equally to all citizens.
Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 610 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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expected to fight for social justice in a world where the socially just are unfairly
called racists? This vicious circle of silence and fear, amplifies the need for the
Supreme Court to exercise its role in "secur[ing] the blessings of liberty" to all
people.
JENNIFER MOORE

